REVIEWS by unknown
REVIEWS
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED B1Y THE
UNITED STATES. By Charles Cheney Hyde. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1945. Pp. lxxxvi, xvii, xv, 2489. Three vols. $45.00.
IN 1922 Professor Hyde brought out the first edition of his treatise on
"International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States." Reviewers 1 at once recognized the special value inherent in his
method of surveying this branch of law from a national viewpoint. It gives
due emphasis to history and practice as well as to principle. And by relating
general doctrine to the decisions of one particular jurisdiction it achieves a
needed sense of reality. Every lawyer knows the difference between study-
ing, say for example, the law of contract in general and the law of contract
as applied in a particular state. It is the underlining of this difference which
gives to Professor Hyde's work a substance and practicality which are so
often missing in treatises on international law and the absence of which has
made jurists like J. C. Gray wonder whether international law was lay:,2
and judges like Mr. Justice Roberts deny the very existence of international
law. 3
Since the publication of the first edition, Mr. Hyde has served as Solicitor
for the Department of State for more than two years, as counsel in impor-
tant international controversies, as professor of international law and
diplomacy at Columbia University and as an intimate adviser of senior
officials of our Department of State. He has gained an unique insight into
American diplomatic practice by his association with Mr. Charles Evans
Hughes, of whose work as Secretary of State he has written an important
account. With this enriched background, he has thoroughly re-vritten his
1922 work and made it a book of increased value not only to lawyers and
judges here and abroad,4 but to anyone profoundly interested in American
history or American government and to any editor or writer who wants to
place in perspective world events of the day. For illustration, these volumes
give invaluable material on the Monroe doctrine,* the history of the prin-
ciple of self-determination,6 the withdrawal of diplomatic relations,7 the
treatment of prisoners of war s and the procedure of a peace conference.
1. Book Reviews (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 897, 35 HARv. L. REv. 971.
2. J. C. GRAY, Tm NATuRE Aim SoumcEs or THE L.Aw (2d ed. 1921) 126.
3. N. Y. Times, July 14, 1945, p. 20, col. 8.
4. See, for example, the recognition of Mr. Hyde's first edition by A. D. McNiun,
LEcL, EFFECTs OF WAR (2d ed. 1944) =, et passign.
5. §§ 85-97, pp. 281-315.
6. § 108, pp. 363-68.
7. § 587, pp. 1656-7.
8. §§ 668-672, pp. 1844-57.
9. §§ 914-918, pp. 2402-9.
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It would be superfluous for me to try to summarize here the three volumes
of this work, inasmuch as in a concluding "Explanatory Statement" 10
Mr. Hyde himself epitomizes his treatise. It will be enough if, before com-
menting on particular subjects, I note that the volumes cover all the topics
usually embraced in treatises on international law and that for every topic
there is a wealth of material derived from treaties, from statutes, from judi-
cial decisions, from digests of executive opinions, from official communica-
tions of the Presidefit, the Department of State, and other governmental
agencies, from occasional speeches of distinguished Americans, from text-
books and from law review articles. No one who had spent less than a life-
time in international law could have made such a useful collection, for most
of the material is not readily to be found in indices to periodicals or in formal
law publications but requires day-to-day reading and collecting of items
that are often wrongly regarded as ephemeral.
In this second edition Professor Hyde takes American developments up
to the late summer of 1941.11 He, therefore, has occasion to review our atti-
tude during the early part of World War II before the United States was a
belligerent. One of the critical problems with which he necessarily deals is
the transfer of destroyers to the United Kingdom in 1940.12 While the author
uses language of extreme caution, he evidently does not subscribe to the
reasoning of the opinion signed by Attorney General Jackson on August 27,
1940 and commonly attributed at least in part to the present Counsellor of
the Department of State, Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen. It is Mr. Hyde's view,
as it was Professor Borchard's view, 13 and Secretary of State Day's view, 14
that it is ordinarily a grave offense against the law of nations for a neutral
government to sell a man-of-war to a belligerent. But Mr. Hyde satisfies
himself that while the destroyer deal "may have constituted American inter-
vention in the European War . . . , that intervention was not necessarily
illegal." 16 And by a similar chain of argumentation he refrains from con-
demning the Lend-Lease Act.16 As one who supported and supports these
actions of the United States, this reviewer would have preferred to have had
Mr. Hyde admit that the actions were unlawful and that their justification
before the bar of history must rest on grounds other than the law. It does
not aid men who must face future crises to be told that in those transactions
President Roosevelt and Congress acted according to law, any more than
itwould aid them to pretend that when President Jefferson bought Louisiana
or President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation or President
10. Pp. 2428-39.
11. Foreword, p. vii.
12. § 848A, pp. 2234-37. See also § 848.
13. See Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for
Naval Bases (1940) 34 Au. J. INT. L. 690.





Theodore Roosevelt acquired the Panama Canal they scrupulously adhered,
in the former eases, to the law of the United States Constitution or, in the
later case, to the law of nations. 7
Since he has taken 1941 as the terminal point of his interest, Mr. Hyde
has not had to consider the course of our belligerent conduct in World War
II. However, he correctly portrayed the attitude which this country would
take in regard to saboteurs and spies in war time.1 Unfortunately, he was
not equally prophetic with respect to the position that this nation would
take upon the question of its right to try as criminals those who led the A-xis
powers into an aggressive war. Since Mr. Hyde did not read the Briand-
Kellogg pact as imposing upon individual statesmen personal responsibility
to a world tribunal established to scrutinize their conduct,1" he thought that
this nation if it desired to punish the head of a state who had embarked upon
an aggressive war would be unjustified in trying him as a war criminal but
instead would be remitted to using, as in the case of Napoleon, a mere e:xecu-
tive determination to retain him in custody. : '3
Mr. Hyde's admirable discussion of aerial bombardment 21 also deserves
note. He wrote at a time when it was already apparent that in World War II
there had been appalling deviations from the requirements of international
law.2 2 And he makes a convincing case for the proposition that only an inter-
national entity should be allowed to possess certain types of weapons, among
which he would undoubtedly now include the atom bomb. -
Another problem arising out of the war on which Professor Hyde has some
timely remarks is the right of a belligerent to go beyond a sequestration of,
and completely to confiscate without eventual reparation, the local property
of enemy aliens resident in the enemy country. Agreeing with Professor
Borchard, 24 Professor Hyde asserts that there is no such right. -  Admittedly
17. In justice to Mr. Hyde I note that he has been more forthright in raising questions
as to the validity of the April 9, 1941 agreement between the American Secretary of State
and the Danish Minister at Washington, yielding to the United States the right to construct
bases in Greenland. § 1333.
18. § 677, pp. 1862-65, see particularly note 10. Because of the 1941 date line of his
book, Mr. Hyde refrains from citing E parle Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942). Compare Mr.
Hyde's ov.n article, Aspects of the Saboteur Cases (1943) 37 Ai. J. Iher. L. 83.
19. § 596A, pp. 1680-5.
20. § 919, particularly p. 2411. Accord: Milton L Konvitz, Will Xuremberg Smrc
Justice (1946) 1 CoMMNTARY 9; WNyzansli, The Nuremrlterg War Crimnrals Trial, An.
AcAD. OF ARTs AND Sctr-xcEs, Dec. 12, 1945. Contra: TRrAL oF WAR C nm;%s (U. S.
Dept. State 1945). Compare S. GLUECE, WNAR CRi =A.Ls (1944) passim.
21. § 663, pp. 1822-6.
22. P. 1835.
23. Pp. 1835-6.
24. See for example, Borchard, Treatment of Enemy Prirate Prop.rly in the Uritcld
States before the World War (1928) 22 Am. J. INT. L. 636, 637.
25. § 622 pp 1735-8.
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this position is not only contrary to some American 25 and English 27 au-
thorities but is premised on absolute views of property rights which though
they have been traditional since the time of John'Locke are in some quarters
regarded as obsolescent.28
A closely allied question is the right under international law of a country
to confiscate without compensation all property of a particular class, without
discriminating between holdings by its own nationals and holdings by aliens.
This is an issue which was to the forefront when Mexico expropriated with-
out compensation the agrarian and oil properties of its citizens and of for-
eigners. On that issue, as chairman of an American Bar Association Com-
mittee 29 and here again as author, 0 Mr. Hyde has taken the position that
it is contrary to the law of nations to expropriate private property without
making provision for adequate, effective and prompt payment. In this view
the American government, through many spokesmen and most recently
through Secretary Hull,3 ' has so far concurred. Whether, particularly in our
foreign policy toward Eastern European countries, for instance, this attitude
will continue to prevail, no one can foretell, but in any future controversy
the arguments of Mr. Hyde will undoubtedly receive the close attention
they merit.
Mr. Hyde has a refreshingly modern approach to the question whether
the national government of the United States has constitutional power to
enter into an international treaty covering matters which, in the absence of
a commitment to a foreign government, would be regarded as within the
exclusive power of the several states.3 2 The question has come to the fore
particularly since the United States has become a member of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization 11 and has thus come under a duty to lay before
the Senate, or perhaps the Senate and the House of Representatives, any
International Labor Convention which the national government is, under
our Constitution, competent to adopt. Mr. Hyde seems to take the stand
that since the convention is a genuine international treaty, the Senate is
competent to ratify it 34 and if the particular convention is not, as some of
the conventions are, self-executing,35 to enact enforcing legislation. This
26. § 621 especially p. 1733. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 11
(1926).
27. A. D. McNAIR, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 125, 126; notes 7-8, 221. See authorities re-
ferred to in Standard Oil Co. v. Markham, 67 U. S. P. Q. 263, 272, 276 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
28. H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1945) 163.
Compare Report on the Berlin-Potsdam Conference IV, 3 (Aug. 2, 1945), WORLD ALMANAC
(1946) 112. Contra A. L. I., ESSENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS, Art. 10.
29. P. 710, n. 3.
30. § 217A-§ 217D, pp. 710-25.
31. Pp. 710-1, 714, 718-9, 720-2.
32. §§ 496-502, pp. 1387-1401.
33. P. 132, n. 15.
34. Pp. 1389-90, pp. 1397-8.
35. See opinion of Stone, C. J., concurring in part, Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318
U. S. 724, 738 (1943).
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stand contrasts with the, it seems to me, untenable doubts expressed by
some of the legal advisers of the Department of State.-3
Upon the problems of nationality Mr. Hyde has revised his text in the
light of the Nationality Act of 1940 and his discussions with the expert of
the Department of State, Mr. Richard Flournoy. Because Mr. Hyde does
not go beyond 1941 he had no occasion to consider how far Sclhncidcrman v.
Uvited States '7 would require a modification of his statements upon im-
peachment and revocation of naturalization03 Nor did he have any reason
to review recent statutory and judicial developments extending the right of
naturalization to Chinese " and Arabs.-0 These developments would, of
course, require a change in some statements in his text.41
One of Mr. Hyde's passages which has broad interest for students of juris-
prudence is his illuminating contrast between the canons of treat), interpre-
tation followed by the Supreme Court of the United States and those adopted
by the Permanent Court of International Justice.42 It is interesting to com-
pare the willingness of the former with the unwillingness of the latter to give
an altered construction of a plain text of a treaty because of diplomatic ex-
changes and correspondence indicating the views of negotiators of the treaty.
But it may be suggested that one of Mr. Hyde's arguments in support of the
American practice goes too far. He asserts -1 that the American courts
properly disregard the common law rule for the exclusion of negotiators'
statements inasmuch as "the reason why, according to the common law,
declarations of intention could not be given in aid of the interpretation of
documents, save under certain exceptional circumstances, was that they
were considered as dangerous for a jury, who, not being expert in such
matters, might attach to them too great weight." This seems to misstate
the reason for the common law parol evidence rule (which incidentally
applies in non-jury as well as in jury cases). The parol evidence rule is not
concerned with any precautions or limitations based on probative value."
It embodies the principle that "when a jural act is embodied in a single
memorial, all other utterances of the parties on that topic are legally im-
material for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act." 11
If the foregoing analysis of the parol evidence be correct, then the difference
between the Supreme Court of the United States and the Permanent Court
of International Justice is a difference not in evidential but in substantive
standards. It is a difference which would warrant draftsmen of future
36. P. 1398, n. 5.
37. 320 U. S. 118 (1943).
38. § 370, pp. 1125-8.
39. 57 Stat. 600, 601; 8 U. S. C. § 703 (Supp. 1943).
40. Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944).
41. § 354, pp. 1095-9.
42. §§ 533B-535, pp. 1478-1502.
43. P. 1497.
44. 9 WiG'.m.o, EVIENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2400.
45. Id. at § 2425.
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treaties in inserting in the text a specific provision that the text was (or was
not) to be construed in the light of diplomatic exchanges and correspondence.
Without such a provision there is a risk that courts of independent authority
will constantly differ on their construction of the same document, and that
difference may be justicially irreconciliable.
On the whole these volumes in format and in ease of cross-reference are so
admirable, that it may not be amiss to note one minor criticism as to citation
of authorities. Mr. Hyde deservedly cites opinions of Secretaries of State
and Solicitors by the name of their author, for he knows how much the
standing of the author of an executive interpretation counts in determining
its weight. The principle is no different with judges. And so it is somewhat
disappointing to see opinions of lower federal courts cited only by volume
and page number without reference to the particular court or (as is ad-
mittedly not always necessary) to the particular judge. Just as for Mr. Hyde
the words of a Hughes or Hackworth have special value, so for us on the
bench the words of a Hand or Hough have particular significance.
CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR.t
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS PAST AND FUTURE. Manley 0. Hudson. Wash-
ington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Brookings
Institution, 1944. Pp. xii, 287. $2.50.
THE present volume was written on the joint request of the Brookings
Institution and the Carnegie Endowment. They asked Judge Hudson,
probably the best qualified expert in the field, to appraise the work of the
pre-war international tribunals in terms of the presumable functions of
judicial organization in the post-war world. Judge Hudson has mastered
the vast task in this relatively small-sized volume, which covers even such
rather academic topics as the Proposed International Loans Tribunal and
the Proposed International Commercial Tribunals. Perhaps too much em-
phasis has been placed by the author on the Permanent Courts; other inter-
national tribunals did considerably more work. It is more regrettable that
the period prior to the Jay Treaty (1794) has been practically omitted. With
these limitations, however, the survey offered is quite comprehensive, and
its value is greatly augmented by the careful bibliography for which the
author pays deserved praise to Mr. Louis B. Sohn (but why omit in the
bibliography of a monograph the titles of the articles cited?). Notwith-
standing the disclaimer in the foreword by Messrs. Finch and Moulton, this
volume is a useful reference book which should find its place in the library
of every international lawyer.
t United States District Judge, Massachusetts; the American legal expert on 1, L. 0.
Committee on Application of Conventions.
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The original purpose of the book, namely, to aid by constructive sugges-
tions the formation of the post-war international judiciary, has been largely
frustrated by the recent creation of the International Court of Justice. As
it is well known, the disjunction of the new and the former permanent court
is the outcome of Russian hostility against everything connected with the
League of Nations. Now the problems arising from the disjunction have
become prominent in the matter of international tribunals. The possibility
of a development of this kind the author, whose preface is dated August
1944, could hardly take into consideration. Still he touches upon the Soviet
dislike of arbitration, giving as explanation a bon m t by Mr. Lit-inoff (pp.
44, 240). There is much more behind this dislike. Even the Tsarist rCgime
had been unfavorable to arbitration of Russian rights, and Soviet political
philosophy added weighty reasons of principle. Experiences in the only
international arbitration in which the Soviet Government was a party-
the Lena Goldfields case 1-were most discouraging.
In other respects, too, a more searching appraisal would have been desir-
able. The performance of the Permanent Court of International Justice
was not impressive as far as judgments are concerned (perhaps the advisory
opinions are the more auspicious phase of the Court's work). During its
eighteen working years (1922-1940) the Court rendered only 32 judgments
in about 25 cases most of which were politically of minor importance. The
author comments on the judgments merely by saying "each was important
to the parties [how could it be otherwise?] and some were of wider signifi-
cance." Regarding the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the author
refrains from any comment concerning the very unfavorable statistics on
this point. There is nothing to question the author's remark that the Court's
work has been "generally hailed with satisfaction throughout the world,"
but it may be observed that we have not yet an investigation of this issue.
A Columbia student paper, examining public reaction to a particular ad-
visory opinion, has recently brought to light the interesting fact that the
New York Times and the London Times not only register American and
English comments, respectively, but also those coming from other countries.
This fact would seem to facilitate further investigation along the lines indi-
cated.
ARTHUR Nussuxut
1. 3 NussBAum, INTERNATIONALES JAHRBUCH FUER SCInEDsGEP.ICrrswSix M
zivm-uND HANDELSSACEmN (1926) 429 (reproducing part of the informative award in the
English original). Cf. also LAUTERP'AkcT, ANNU, u DIGEST OF PuaBc IchEPrx0ATioAL
CASES (1929-30) 426.
i Visiting Research Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
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ToWARD IMPROVING PH.D. PROGRAMS. By Ernest V. Hollis. Washington,
D. C.: American Council on Education, 1945. Pp. xii, 204. $2.50.
"TowARD Improving Ph.D. Programs" is the latest in a series of Ameri-
can educational 8tudies published by the American Council on Education
in Washington. Dr. Ernest V. Hollis, the author-who is currently a spe-
cialist in the United States Office of Education-has utilized in his study a
considerable amount of statistical and questionnaire material gathered by
the Commission, to which he has appended his own interpretations and
conclusions. He has acted upon the very reasonable premise that the in-
fluence of graduate schools in the United States upon Ph.D. recipients leaves
much to be desired and has arrived at several rather conservative though
not insignificant suggestions which deserve notice. What is not very satis-
factory about Dr. Hollis' book-and the fault runs through the entire book
-is the inapplicability of the statistical tables to those suggestions. If a
reading of the statistics related to his conclusions, their meaning whether
original or no would be satisfactory, but it does not. In themselves charts
dealing with past employment opportunities for and distribution of, the
graduate student are worthwhile even when they are partly vitiated by in-
determinable factors. But their inclusion, along with the somewhat undi-
gested and conflicting opinions of numerous college presidents, deans, pro-
fessors of the Arts and Sciences, professors of Education, and others, mars
the general effect.
Perhaps it will appear unfair to criticize adversely where statistics bearing
on employment possibilities and reasonable observations on higher education
are both included, but the implied juxtaposition of the two so pervades both
Dr. Hollis' book and his own personal approach to education that the ideal
graduate school is pictured as an institution which will best satisfy the
demands of employers of industrial chemists, of government analysts, of
teachers not called upon to practise research, and of research scholars not
called upon to teach. Although the successful fulfillment of employers' re-
quirements would be a fortunate and right thing for any graduate school,
such a goal ought to be subordinated to the much larger conception of the
University as an agent for advancing knowledge within and beyond its own
walls. To examine the graduate school by first appealing to the employ-
ment situation and to employers generally distorts by granting too much to
the immediately practical the true idea of a university.
In' these days of utilitarian propaganda few people would deny that in-
stitutions of higher learning have important responsibilites to society which
should guide their program. The question to be asked is to what extent the
University should be allowed to determine the benefits of education in its
own terms. Is it right that university authorities after studying one of
Hollis's employment tables should decide to take money away from the
classics department and invest it in physical education and home economics?
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Although it would be a logical action, I hope not. Hollis' corollary to the
idea of University responsibility, namely that "the graduate school should
continuously adapt its program to the social uses which prospective doctors
of philosophy can make of the information and insight gained in their
study" might, outside the narrow confines of his statistical material, be a
good one. However, on an educational plane "social uses" should not be
equated with employment distribution and possibilities. Deans poring
over his figures -ill find that m6re than 7, 8, and 12 percent of the men and
women who received Ph.D.'s in the 1930's in the Classics, in Germanic
Studies, and in Art and Archeology respectively were not gainfully employed
in September 1940, a relatively high proportion, yet the universities would
hardly be assisting knowledge-and incidentally society-by further em-
phasizing the very popular field of chemistry at the expense of the other
three. Yet, even without such charts and graphs and figures the tendency
in that direction is very strong. It will perhaps help educators to face the
statistical evidence calmly if they realize how inaccurate the figures are in
presenting the situation. For example, one table concerning the employment
problem reveals that 17.6 percent of Bryn Mawr's Ph.D. recipients in the
1930's and 26 percent of Radcliffe's were subsequently not gainfully em-
ployed, which would seem to prove that a greater percentage of Radcliffe's
doctors than Bryn MawT's are wasting their educational substance cooking
for their husbands. That 22,509 graduate students acquired Ph.D.'s in the
1930's should doubtless give us pause, but that 3.8 percent of them were
later unemployed has little meaning. Hollis, while attempting to tell us how
much cooking was involved, merely discloses other incalculable factors.
According to some of his figures a small percentage of the students have
after receiving their degrees become "improperly" employed. To brighten
up an otherwise difficult and technical style Hollis cites as examples the
cases of a Ph.D. in Greek, who after contact with the material world became
a retailer of bakery products, and of an historian operating a flower shop.
Such misfits, if such they be-and one cannot be sure that they are from their
occupations alone-considering the time and effort spent upon them in
graduate school, are regrettable, but I suppose inevitable, and should not
have much bearing on programs of higher education. Wayward Greek
scholars are not important problems.
Outside the statistical framework of the book Hollis' treatise deserves
consideration. Although the extracts he presents from questionnaires an-
swered by educators and lay employers are naturally, in so complicatcd a
problem as education, often conflicting and contradictory, one important
common denominator remains and as such merits some attention. Almost
all those questioned suggested that the University be more careful to equip
the graduate student with fundamental knowledge of his subject even at the
cost of less intensive knowledge in a narrow field. Comprehensive knowledge
in a very particular area, although eminently desirable, seems often to imply
that the student's education is superficial in related fields.
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Concerning the scope of graduate work and the scholastic program in
detail Hollis exercises his own judgments, which are more satisfying than
his analyses of figures and questionnaires. After pointing out in his opening
chapter the original forces that have defined doctoral work, he discusses two
of the greatest problems confronting the graduate schools and their inter-
pretation of the Ph.D. degree, the demands for greater training in the more
purely vocational fields such as human nutrition, home economics, library
science, education, and agricultural specializations, and the transfer of
primary responsibility for productive scientific research to non-university
agencies. Regarding the first problem he states that orthodox graduate
schools do not yet publicly acknowledge that the bachelor's degree has lost
its meaning as the basis for admission to graduate work and the master's
degree its significance as a proving ground for doctoral candidates. To judge
from his other statements Hollis means by this that it is unreasonable-and
possibly anti-social-to require an expert in physical education to be ac-
quainted with the classical languages, with French, and with English history,
which might all be a part of the normal B. A. program. If that be his mean-
ing-it is difficult to see any other-it would signify a degradation of the
graduate school to the level of vocational education. Such procedure might
well interfere with Hollis' own plea for Ph.D. recipients with broader back-
grounds. "The present artificial barriers to scholarly but practical programs
of study" as he terms the language requirements may really be a method of
ensuring that competent and educated men enter the newer fields. The
author himself dismisses in the case of education the escape from the problem
to be found in substituting a new degree for the Ph.D.; he states that the
prestige of the traditional degree renders the newer Ed.D. somewhat un-
satisfactory in marketing value. In that dismissal it seems to me incorrect
to impute the prestige of the Ph.D. to tradition only. Surely the assurance
that the doctor of philosophy has a satisfactory B.A. should enhance the
prestige of the more advanced degree.
In a state of society in which the more complex and practical scientific
research has been transferred away from the university campus Hollis sug-
gests that graduate school faculty members will have to devote more of their
time and talent to preparing others for research than to doing research them-
selves and that less emphasis will have to be placed on the student's inde-
pendent contribution to knowledge. Whatever the solution there is bound
to be a radical change iii the approaches to education in the natural sciences.
The issue seems to involve either less emphasis in the universities upon the
more practical scientific research or government subsidization and all the
consequences such a policy might entail. Dr. Hollis refuses, I think out of
deference to his governmental position, to urge the latter course.
In his conclusion Hollis pleads for greater cooperation from and integra-
tion of the various departments in the graduate school, an overhauling of
dissertation procedure, and a more responsible approach to the individual
student's character and overall development. That the graduate school like
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its parent institution the university should always strive towards easier
understanding and communication between departments seems clear; aside
from the somewhat unfriendly result of English and Chemistry professors
shooting off on arbitrary tangents into intellectual space, departmental iso-
lation retards the exploration of unknovM areas between the humanistic
studies and the various sciences. An overhauling of dissertation procedure
provides greater room for controversy. To avoid the dilemma between the
demand to produce a thesis making an original contribution to knowledge
on the one hand and the difficulty of choosing an interesting worthwhile
topic on the other Hollis would place greater emphasis on cooperative re-
search. He states that research techniques (by no means adequately taught
at present) and "the development of human qualities essential to working
effectively with others" would be gained thereby. And, what he does not
suggest, work requiring mass production, armies of students plowing through
nineteenth century obituaries and the like, would be accomplished. No
doubt the results might have real value as discoveries, but the gains to the
student would certainly be limited. What the student needs far more are
opportunities for developing individual initiative and there seem no other
ways to acquire that than to make one's own individual and original contri-
bution, however small. Hollis' suggestions concerning cooperative scholar-
ship do not solve the problem.
Perhaps more weight should be given to the imaginative exercise of select-
ing research topics. Admittedly imagination in such matters unless latent
in the student cannot be presented to him, but surely what imagination is
present should be constantly stimulated by professorial enthusiasm and
explanation toward the meaning of scholarship. Too often that is omitted.
So much can be learned only by writing a dissertation; some students find
in the attempt that they cannot write them; others discover that they must
employ much more than fact-finding abilities. The professor's task, at least
negatively speaking, is to avoid stiffing the student's enthusiasm by guiding
him into progressively interesting and significant channels. Too frequently
the English student in graduate school is successful to the degree that he
can digest the routine of collecting unimportant facts, known and unknown,
without reference to their applicability to wider problems. Such procedure
deadens the imagination and makes more difficult the job of realizing what
worthwhile scholarship is.
To teach graduate students successfully a professor ought to have con-
tributed enthusiastically to scholarship himself rather than to have looked
upon it merely as effort toward advancement. (That rule, to a lesser degree,
ought also to be applied to the teaching of undergraduates.) Hollis, mis-
takenly, I think, tends to minimize the essential connection between teaching
and research, which is certainly more than the artificial one of environment.
Failure to appreciate that connection is an illustration perhaps of his utili-
tarian approach to education. He scarcely seems aware of the fact that the
concentration of the science teacher upon teaching only may include contra-
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dictory elements. Actually, teaching and research seem to involve different
experiences which in operating upon each other are mutually beneficial.
The one contributes ideas to the other in the absence of which the single
field becomes unimaginative and lacking in intellectual variety.
Hollis makes much of the failure of many graduate schools to provide
adequately for the developing personality and the social welfare of the
student, who beyond his role as scholar is forgotten. Many who may be able
to satisfy scholastic requirements are not fitted for reasons of personality
to be teachers or industrial and governmental research workers. Those basi-
cally unfit should be prevented from entering graduate school; others should
be introduced to a larger range of social experience than that to be acquired
in the library stacks. Hollis is certainly right in decrying the denial of re-
sponsibility in such matters which are sometimes made by college authorities.
Unlike the undergraduates the graduate student, who is by the nature of his
rather confining work in as much need of social guidance, is often neglected
and becomes less a citizen.of the world than when he embarked upon his
course of study. Instead of fitting him for his future work, his education
may actually retard him. Prospective teachers especially are sent out to
teach without adequate training in the arts of communication. What is
learned through the illustration and example of the graduate professor tends
frequently to be the wrong prescription for undergraduate teaching. Recog-
nition of that fact, Hollis feels, should be acted upon. There should be a
sense of responsibility for the general well being of the student beyond that
for his purely intellectual development.
Altogether Mr. Hollis' book despite its materialistic approach is probably
worth the reading for anyone interested in the problems of advanced educa-
tion. Having once admitted the assumption that the graduate school must
adapt itself to "social uses" it goes on to discuss certain techniques and im-
mediate goals. Those in themselvesare worth noting. One need only real-
ize that the pursuit of those more superficial problems will not answer the
question of the university's place in society.
WILLIAI HOWARD TAFT III t
FOOD OR FA.AnE: THE CHALLENGE OF EROSION. By Ward Shepard. New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1945. Pp. x, 225. $3.00.
"MODERN man has perfected two devices, either of which is capable of
annihilating civilization." This sounds like the introduction to an article
on the atomic bomb, but Ward Shepard had something quite different in
mind when he wrote Food or Famine: The Challenge of Erosion. He goes on
to say that one of these devices "is total war," and the other is "world soil
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erosion. Of the two, soil erosion is the more insidiously and fatally destruc-
tive. War . . .destroys the social environment. . . .Soil erosion destroys
the natural environment which is its foundation .... The reconstruction
of the world's brokendown soils and river systems is the most gigantic and
complex economic task confronting men."
Such a statement may sound extreme when one considers the problems
presented by the exhaustion of minerals, the density of population in coun-
tries such as India and China, and the rivalry of nations for the control of
resources and markets. Nevertheless, there is a terrible menace in the state-
ment that erosion is "in progress on more than half our land surface-on
more than a billion acres of the less than two billion acres in the continental
United States. . . .Over 100 million acres of our best cropland (have)
been irremediably ruined for further cultivation." Moreover, of the 400
million acres now in use about 150 million have been "so severely damaged
as to make farming difficult or unprofitable." Still more impressive is the
fact that farming, grazing, and lumbering have made it possible for the rain
to carve over 200 million gullies in the United States.
Having frightened us by such figures, the author states his main purpose.
He "attempts to answer the question: What kind of cooperative social action
must be undertaken to rebuild and stabilize our land and water resources in
order to keep the good earth permanently fruitful?" Before answering this
question he points out that the river valley is the natural geographic unit
with which we must deal. It is the whole valley and not a part which must
be considered. It is useless, for example, to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars on the lower Mississippi River and at the same time permit millions
of tons of soil to be swept off the upper parts of that river's valley and de-
posited lower down. Nor is it sensible to attempt to prevent erosion without
also taking measures so that the right use may be made of the entire water-
shed. In practically every river valley the land should be scientifically di-
vided into parts devoted to farming, to grazing, and to forestry. At the same
time provision must be made for water power, water supply, transportation,
and the location of industries and cities. In other words all the activities of
each main river valley must be coordinated.
This brings us to a most interesting problem. What kind of organization
will best carry out such broad policies? Shall we rely on private enterprise,
on the government, or on some combination of the two? Shepard's solution
has a political and social as well as economic significance. He does not want
"bureaucratic hierarchies whose function is to do the things they think
people need." What we need is some way of organizing people so that they
will do these things for themselves. The soil conservation districts set up
by the federal government supply the best model. Their peculiar feature
is that they are set up by vote of the land users, both owners and tenants.
Boards of supervisors chosen in this way cooperate with federal, state,
county, educational, and private agencies. Governmental advisory experts
work with the elected supervisors in setting up rules for preventing erosion
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and restoring the land to its former productivity. Shepard believes that
some such method of cooperation between many types of agencies can be
applied to the development of entire river valleys. It is his considered con-
clusion that "considering that the earth can continue to be inhabited by
man for endless ages . . . the value of a given acre of land is literally infi-
nite, and the amount of money we can afford to spend to conserve it is
limited only by its potential long-range productivity and by the amount of
human energy available to conserve it. . . . Land deterioration can no
longer be tolerated."
One of the great legal problems of the next generation will doubtless be
the framing of methods by which to secure the fullest and most fruitful com-
bination of private initiative and public responsibility in developing the
possibilities of the land from which we all draw our means of support.
ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTONt
t Professor of Geography, Yale University.
